We consider an optimal regulation model in which the regulated …rm's production cost is subject to random, publicly observable shocks. The distribution of these shocks is correlated with the …rm's cost type which is private information. The regulator designs an incentive compatible regulatory scheme which adjusts itself automatically ex post given the realization of the cost shock. We derive the optimal scheme assuming that there is an upper bound on the …nancial losses that the …rm can sustain in any given state. We …rst consider a two-types, two-states case, and then extend the results to the case of a continuum of …rm types and an arbitrary …nite number of states. We show that the …rst best allocation can be implemented if the state of nature conveys enough information about the …rm's type and (or) the maximal loss that the …rm can sustain is su¢ciently large. Otherwise, the solution is characterized by classical second-best features.
Introduction
The optimal regulation literature has seen major developments in the recent twenty years.
This literature has mainly focused on the issue of how to regulate a …rm when it has private information about its demand and cost functions. Most of this literature considers static models: the …rm is assumed to face a given demand and cost functions and the question then is how to induce it to truthfully report its private information in order to enable the regulator to maximize a weighted average of consumers' surplus and …rm's pro…ts. In practice however, regulated rates are typically set for an extended period of time, typically few years. During this period, the demand and cost conditions may be subject to random shocks. Therefore, it is important to design ‡exible regulatory mechanisms that can respond to these shocks. This is evident from the California electricity crisis in 2000/1, where …xed regulated retail prices completely insulated consumers from ‡uctuations of prices in the deregulated wholesale market. These …xed retail prices e¤ectively drove California's two largest utilities -Paci…c Gas & Electric and Southern California Edison -to the point of insolvency after wholesale prices rose by 500% between the second half of 1999 and the second half of 2000.
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The present analysis di¤ers from classical optimal regulation theory (e.g., Myerson, 1982, La¤ont and Tirole, 1986 , and Lewis and Sappington, 1988) because the …rm's cost is subject to publicly observable random shocks that are correlated with the …rm's type which is private information for the …rm. For instance, the cost shocks could be ‡uctuations of the observable cost components of the …rm; when the …rm has high observable costs its unobserved cost components, which represent its type, are also likely to be high. Or, the shocks could be costly equipment failures: when the …rm experiences a large number of such failures, its technology (i.e., its type) is likely to be ine¢cient. The regulator designs an incentive compatible regulatory scheme that adjusts itself automatically ex post given the realization of the publicly observed shock, before the …rm produces. This regulatory scheme can be thought of as an "indexed," or state-contingent incentive scheme: the regulator does not have to redesign it after the realization of each cost shock. 1 For details, see Joskow (2001) .
Another important element of our model are limited liability constraints: there is an upper bound on the losses that the …rm can sustain in any given state of nature (each corresponds to a speci…c cost shock). We …nd that whenever the realization of the random cots shocks conveys enough information about the …rm's type and (or) the maximal de…cit that the …rm can sustain in any given state is su¢ciently large, the regulator can design a scheme that implements the …rst-best allocation despite the fact that the …rm's type, which determines the distribution of its costs in the various states of nature, is private information. The regulatory scheme that implements the …rst-best under the most stringent limited de…cit constraints "rewards" the …rm in exactly one state of nature and imposes the same "punishment" on the …rm in all other states. When the conditions ensuring that the …rst-best allocation can be implemented fail, we …nd that the solution is characterized by classical second-best features, i.e., the production levels of ine¢cient types are distorted downwards to reduce the expected cost of informational rents, there is no distortion "at the top," and there is no (expected) rent "at the bottom." We obtain these results …rst in a simple, two-types, two-states case, and then extend them to the case of a continuum of …rm types and an arbitrarily large, but …nite, number of states of nature.
The idea that regulators can exploit the correlation between ex post public signals and the …rm's type and design signal-dependent transfers that implement the …rst-best allocation was …rst explored by Riordan and Sappington (1988) . Their results are analogous to those of McLean (1985, 1988) in the context of auction theory -the main di¤erence being that in the context of auctions, the reports of other bidders play the role that the ex post public signals play in the Riordan and Sappington model. Our paper di¤ers from Riordan and Sappington (1988) in that in their model, the ex post signals are purely informational whereas in our paper, they are real cost shocks that a¤ect not only the …rm's transfers but also the …rm's cost and hence its output. Another important di¤erence is that Riordan and Sappington's methodology allows them to prove that the …rst-best solution can be implemented but does not provide a characterization of the optimal regulatory scheme.
In contrast, we fully characterize the optimal regulatory scheme both when the …rst-best solution can be implemented as well as when it cannot be implemented.
It has long been recognized that limited liability constraints are important to assess the robustness of the …rst-best implementation results of McLean (1985, 1988) and Riordan and Sappington (1988) . Robert (1991) considers an auction problem in which each bidder can have …nitely many possible types but the types of di¤erent bidders are correlated. He shows that if there are upper bounds on the payments that the bidders can make, then the auctioneer may not be able extract the full surplus from each bidder as in Crémer and McLean (1988) . Kosmopoulou and Williams (1998) consider a related model of group decision-making although in their model, there is a continuum of agents' types.
They show that it is impossible to implement the …rst-best allocation if agents' types are approximately independent and either the monetary transfers among agents or their ex post payo¤s are subject to limited liability constraints. In this paper we therefore incorporate limited liability constraints into the analysis and show how the optimal solution to the regulator's problem changes with the size of the maximal loss that the …rm can sustain in any given state of nature.
Closer to our paper, Demougin and Garvie (1991) were the …rst to study optimal regulation with a continuum of …rm's types, correlated information, and limited liability constraints. We extend their analysis in several ways. First, as Riordan and Sappington (1988) , the signals in Demougin and Garvie (1991) are purely informational. Hence, the …rm's output in their paper is independent of the signals whereas in our paper it is statecontingent. Second, Demougin and Garvie consider either the case where the …rm must earn nonnegative pro…ts in each state of nature or the case in which the regulator is constrained to use nonnegative transfers in every state. In our model by contrast, the maximal loss that the …rm can sustain in each state of nature is a parameter. In particular, we characterize the solution for the regulator's problem for various levels of this parameter. Third, the signal in Demougin and Garvie is binary whereas we consider an arbitrarily large (but …nite) number of states of nature. We show that in order to implement the …rst-best solution under the most stringent limited de…cit constraints, the regulator should use transfers that reward the …rm in exactly one state and impose the same (minimal) punishment on the …rm in all other states. Finally, while Demougin and Garvie rely on constrained calculus of variations techniques, our approach has the advantage of building on the by now familiar and relatively simple methodology of Baron and Myerson (1982) which we adapt to the case of ex post cost shocks and limited liability constraints.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the simple case of two-types and two-states; Section 3 is devoted to the continuum of types, multiple signals case. Some proofs are relegated to an Appendix.
The two-types, two states case
Consider a regulated …rm that produces a single product. The consumers' utility is,
where q is the …rm's output and t is the total transfer made to the …rm. We assume that S(¢) is twice continuously di¤erentiable, strictly increasing and concave The function S(¢) and the transfer t can have at least two interpretations. If the regulated …rm produces a public good which the regulator procures, then q is simply the size or the quality of the public good, S(q) is the gross aggregate utility that consumers derive from the public good, and t is the amount paid to the …rm out of the state's budget. If the …rm is a regulated monopoly producing a private good, then S(q) = R q 0 P (»)d» is the gross consumers' surplus and P (¢) is the inverse demand function for the good. In that case, t = P (q)q + A is the regulated …rm's revenue, where P (q)q is the aggregate sum of the usage fees that consumers pay, and A is either a subsidy paid to the …rm out of the state's budget, or the aggregate sum of …xed fees paid by consumers.
The …rm's cost of production depends on both the realization of a random but publicly observed state of nature (i.e., cost shock), s, and on the …rm's type, µ, which we will assume to be private information for the …rm. For instance, s could represent the observable components of the cost function while µ could represent the unobserved components. Alternatively, s could represent the number of costly equipment failures that the …rm experiences and µ could represent the e¢ciency of the …rm's technology. In this section we assume that there are only two possible states of nature, good (g) and bad (b), and that the …rm could either be of a high (cost) type (h) or a low (cost) type (`). The …rm's cost in state s = g; b when its type is µ = h;`is C µs (q), where C hs (q) > C`s(q) and C 0 hs (q) > C 0 s (q) for s = g; b and C µb (q) > C µg (q) for µ = h;`. That is, high type …rms have higher total and marginal costs than low type …rms in every state of nature and each type of …rm has a higher total cost in bad states than in good states. We also assume that C µs (q) is increasing, weakly convex in q, and C µs (0) < S 0 (0) for µ = h;`and s = g; b.
Recalling that t denotes the …rm's revenue, the …rm's pro…t is
Let Á`be the probability that the …rm's type is low and Á h = 1 ¡ Á`the probability that its type is high. We denote by p µs the conditional probability of state s given that the …rm's type is µ. Hence, p hg + p hb = p`g + p`b = 1: For future reference it is convenient to write the conditional probabilities in matrix form as,
and denote its determinant by J. Since in general, p`g 6 = p hg , the two types of the …rm di¤er from one another in two ways: (i) their cost of production in each state, and (ii) the likelihood that each state occurs. Put di¤erently, …rms' types in our model are multidimensional.
In this respect, our model di¤ers from most of the literature on adverse selection, where types di¤er from one another with respect to a single parameter (e.g., their marginal costs).
Note that when p`g 6 = p hg ; the conditional probabilities matrix H has full rank, and thus, higher is J, the stronger is the correlation between the …rm's type and the state of nature;
consequently, the realization of the state s is more informative about the …rm's type.
The regulator's problem under full information
The regulator chooses a vector (q hg ; q`g; q hb ; q`b; t hg ; t`g; t hb ; t`b) that speci…es a production level and a transfer from consumers to the …rm for each type of …rm and each state of nature.
This vector is chosen before the state of nature is realized. The regulator's objective is to maximize the expected welfare function
The parameter ® captures the regulator's marginal rate of substitution between net consumers' surplus and …rm's pro…ts. Since ® < 1, the regulator will try to minimize the pro…ts that accrue to the …rm.
As usual, we assume that the regulator is constrained to select a mechanism which ensures that the …rm must at least break even on average (otherwise, the regulatory scheme amounts to a con…scation of property). In addition, we also assume that the …rm's pro…t in every state cannot fall below M , where M · 0. That is, M is the maximal loss that the …rm can sustain. Given these assumptions, and using the de…nitions of U and ¼ µs to rewrite the regulator's objective function in a more convenient form, the regulator's problem under full information is, max q hg ;q`g;q hb ;q`b; t hg ;t`g;t hb ;t`b
subject to ex ante individual rationality constraints,
and state-by-state ex post individual rationality (or limited de…cit) constraints, ¼ µs (q µs ; t µs )¸M; µ = h;`; s = g; b:
(IR µs )
Since ® < 1, it is optimal to set the transfers such that the EIR µ constraints will be just binding. Substituting from the EIR µ constraint into the objective function and recalling that S 0 (q) > 0, that C µs (q) is weakly convex in q; and C µs (0) < S 0 (0) for µ = h;à nd s = g; b, it follows that the …rst-best production levels, q ¤ µs , are de…ned implicitly by the …rst order conditions,
That is, at the optimum the regulator uses marginal cost pricing in each state of nature.
Since by assumption,
That is, the low-cost …rm produces more than the high type …rm in each state of nature.
Given the optimal production levels, the optimal transfers are set such that,
When M = 0, (6) implies that ¼ µs (q ¤ µs ; t ¤ µs ) = 0 for µ = h;`; and s = g; b; so t ¤ µs (µ) = C µs (q ¤ µs ). However when M < 0, the regulator has many degrees of freedom in choosing transfers that will satisfy (6). In particular, the regulator can set transfers such that the …rm will earn a positive pro…t in one state and will incur a loss (smaller than M ) in the other state.
The regulator's problem under asymmetric information
We now turn to the case where the …rm's type is not observed by the regulator. By the Revelation Principle, we can restrict attention, without a loss of generality, to direct revelation mechanisms in which the …rm truthfully reports its type to the regulator, and, given a report b µ = h;`; the regulator requires the …rm to produce q b µs units in state s and gives the …rm a transfer t b µs in state s. The regulator's problem in that case is given by RP subject to the EIR µ constraints, the IR µs constraints, and the following incentive compatibility constraints:
where, to simplify notation, we write, ¼ µs = ¼ µs (q µs ; t µs ). Substituting for t from equation (2) into IC`and IC h and simplifying, the two incentive constraints can be rewritten as
where ¢ s (q)´C hs (q) ¡ C`s(q) is the cost di¤erence between the high and the low cost …rms in state s = g; b.
To characterize the solution to the regulator's problem, we will …rst simplify it through a series of Lemmata. It should be noted that the problem cannot be simpli…ed with the usual techniques of the mechanism design literature. For instance, since in general p`g 6 = p hg and p`b 6 = p hb , it is not true that if EIR h is binding then EIR`must be slack (as we shall see below, it is possible that at the optimum, both constraints are binding).
Lemma 1. At the optimum, EIR µ and IC µ ; µ =`; h cannot be both slack.
Proof: Assume by way of negation that both EIR`and IC`are slack. Since EIR`is slack, either IR`g or IR`b or both are also slack, so it is possible to slightly lower t`g or t`b or both. This lowers the right-hand side of IC h and hence relaxes it, without a¤ecting IR hg and IR hb . At the same time, the value of the regulator's objective function is enhanced since ® < 1, thereby contradicting the assumption that the solution is optimal. The proof that EIR h and IC h cannot be both slack is analogous. ¥ Lemma 1 implies that each type of the …rm either breaks even in expectation, or has a binding incentive constraint (to prevent it from misreporting its type), or both. In the latter case, the solution would coincide with the …rst-best solution.
Lemma 2: At the optimum, t`b and t hg can be set such that IR`b and IR hg , respectively, will be binding while IR`g and IR hb are slack.
Proof: Suppose that at the optimum IR`b is slack. Now consider an alternative allocation in which t`b is lowered by "`b > 0 until IR`b is just binding and t`g is increased by
to ensure that EIR`and IC`remain intact. These changes relax IR`g (since t`g is increased)
but have no e¤ect on EIR h , IR hg , IR hb ; and on the regulator's objective function. At the same time the right-hand side of IC h changes by
where the inequality follows because the assumption that
Hence, IC h is relaxed. Altogether, this implies that the new allocation also solves the regulator's problem. Since IR`b is binding, EIR`implies that IR`g must be slack.
The proof concerning t hg is completely analogous. ¥ Lemma 2 is useful because it implies that at any optimal solution, the transfers can be set, without any loss of generality, such that ¼`b = ¼ hg = M . This lemma therefore allows us, once the output levels are determined, to pin down the value of one transfer for each type of …rm. What is then left is to pin down the values of the two remaining state-contingent transfers. In economic terms, note that M can be interpreted as the largest punishment that the regulator can impose on the …rm. With this interpretation in mind, Lemma 2 implies that each type of …rm receives the largest feasible punishment in the state of nature which it is less likely to draw. Given that J¸0, the high type …rm is less likely to draw the good state and the low type …rm is less likely to draw the bad state; hence the high type …rm is punished in the good state while the low type …rm is punished in the bad state.
Lemma 3. If the optimal production levels are strictly monotonic with respect to the …rm's type in each state of nature, i.e., q`s > q hs for s = g; b, then, EIR`and EIR h cannot be both slack.
Proof: Assume by way of negation that at the optimum, EIR`and EIR h are both slack.
Then, Lemma 1 implies that IC`and IC h must be both binding, while Lemma 2 implies
Hence, we can write IC`and IC h respectively, as
and
Dividing equation (7) by p`g, dividing equation (8) by p hg ; and adding the two yields,
The …rst term on the left-hand side of (9) is nonnegative since J´p hb p`g ¡ p hg p`b¸0, and since by Lemma 2, IR hb is slack, so that ¼ hb > M. The second term is strictly positive given the assumption that output is strictly monotonic (recall that ¢ s (q) is assumed strictly increasing with q). Finally, the third term is strictly positive as J¸0 implies that
and as output is strictly monotonic. The left-hand side of (9) must therefore be strictly positive, a contradiction. We conclude that EIR`and EIR h cannot be both slack. ¥ Lemma 3 implies that the optimal mechanism does not give a positive expected rent to both types of the …rm: at least one type must break even in expectation.
Lemma 4. If the optimal production levels are strictly monotonic with respect to the …rm's type in each state of nature, i.e., q`s > q hs for s = g; b, then EIR h is binding.
Proof: Assume be way of negation that EIR h is slack. Then IC h is binding by Lemma 1 and EIR`is binding by Lemma 3. Since ¼`b = M by Lemma 2, EIR`implies that
M ; hence, IC h can be rewritten as
Since EIR h is slack, the left-hand side of (10) is strictly positive. The right-hand side is strictly negative since M < 0; since J¸0 implies
, and since ¢ g (q`g) and ¢ b (q`b)
are both positive. This contradicts the assumption that at the optimum EIR h is slack. ¥ Lemma 4 implies that if output is strictly monotonic with respect to the …rm's type in every state of nature, then, the optimal mechanism is such that the high type …rm breaks even in expectation. That is, in expectation there is no rent "at the bottom."
In order to characterize the optimal mechanism, let us …rst de…ne the information rents of the low type …rm under the …rst-best production plan. That is, the expected payo¤ of a low type …rm from reporting that its type is high when the regulator requires the high type …rm to produce the …rst-best output levels, q ¤ hg and q ¤ hb . As we shall see shortly, these information rents play an important role in the optimal solution. Recalling from Lemma 2 that ¼`b = ¼ hg = M, it follows that the information rents of the low type …rm are
The intuition behind R ¤ is as follows. We are now ready to characterize the optimal mechanism. 
(ii) If R ¤ > 0, the regulator cannot implement the …rst-best solution. The optimal production levels are denoted q
hg and q ¤¤ hb in this case, and are de…ned implicitly by the following …rst-order conditions:
Proof. See the Appendix.
Part (i) of Proposition 1 is closely related to Riordan and Sappington (1988) who show that the …rst-best solution can be implemented, provided that the regulator can condition the regulatory scheme on the realization of an ex post signal that is correlated with the …rm's type and provided that the conditional probabilities matrix which speci…es the likelihood of the various states of nature conditional on the …rm's type has full rank (in our case this simply means that J 6 = 0). There are two important di¤erences however. First, unlike the ex post signals in Riordan and Sappington which a¤ect are purely informational and only a¤ect the …rm's transfers, here the states of nature a¤ect the …rm's cost directly and therefore the …rm's output.
Second and more importantly, in order to induce truthful reporting, the regulator needs to "punish" the low type …rm in the bad state of nature which is less likely to be associated with the low type …rm (the regulator does not "punish" the high type …rm similarly since, given the …rst-best output levels, this …rm does not wish to report that its type is low).
But unlike in Riordan and Sappington, we assume that the …rm needs to earn at least M in every state of nature. Hence, the regulator has only a limited ability to punish the low type …rm for misreporting its type. Part (i) of the proposition shows that given this limitation, the …rst-best can be implemented if and only if jMJj is su¢ciently large; that is, the maximal loss that the …rm can sustain and/or the correlation between the likelihood of each state and the …rm's type are su¢ciently large. When these conditions hold, the low type …rm cannot get positive information rents from misreporting its type.
When jMJj is small, the low type …rm can get positive information rents when it produces the …rst-best output levels of the high type …rm. Since ® < 1, leaving such information rents to the low type …rm is costly from the regulator's perspective and hence, the …rst-best solution cannot be implemented. As part (ii) of the proposition shows, the regulator deals with this case by distorting the output of the high type …rm downward in both states of nature. The optimal solution then has the familiar second-best features:
there is no distortion but there are positive rents "at the top" (the low type …rm produces its …rst-best output level in both states and get a positive expected pro…t) and there is a downward output distortion but full rent extraction "at the bottom" (the high type …rm produces less than in the …rst-best solution in both states of nature and its expected pro…t is 0).
3 Moreover, the proposition shows that the distortion of the high type …rm's output becomes larger as (i) the regulator places a smaller weight on the …rm's pro…t, (ii) the relative probability that the …rm's type is low, and (iii) the di¤erence between the marginal costs of the low and high type …rms is large.
3 The continuum of types, …nitely many states, case
In this section we extend the preceding analysis by assuming that the regulated …rm's type is drawn from the interval £ = £ µ; µ ¤ and the set of states of nature is f1; :::; ng, with higher states representing higher cost shocks (i.e., "worse" states of nature). In the next subsection we will present our basic assumptions about the cost functions and the distributions of types and states of nature. In Section 3.2, we explore the conditions under which the regulator can implement the …rst-best solution and in Section 3.3 we will characterize the second-best solution to the regulator's problem when the …rst-best solution cannot be implemented.
Basic assumptions and notation
We assume that the …rm's total cost function is linear and given by C(q; s; µ) = c s (µ)q;
where 0 < c 1 (µ) < c 2 (µ) < ::: < c n (µ) for all µ 2 £. That is, higher states are associated with higher marginal costs and therefore represent worse states of nature. In addition we assume that for all s 2 f1; :::; ng, the marginal cost, c s (µ), is a strictly positive, twice continuously di¤erentiable, strictly increasing, and convex function of µ.
Let F denote the cumulative distribution function of the …rm's type, µ, on the support £, and assume that the associated density function, f , is strictly positive and continuously di¤erentiable on £. The conditional probability of state s = f1; :::; ng, given type µ, is denoted,
A regulatory scheme is now a state-contingent array, (q s (µ); t s (µ)) s=1;:::;n , where q s (µ)
is the required production level of type µ in state s and t s (µ) is the associated transfer from the regulator to the …rm. 4 The pro…t of a type µ …rm in state s is
As before, we assume that the …rm's pro…t in each state cannot fall below M, where M · 0.
The regulator's problem is the continuous analog of (RP ): max (qs(µ);ts(µ)) s=1;::;n
subject to the ex ante participation constraints,
state-by-state limited-de…cit constraints,
8µ 2 £; 8s 2 f1; :::; ng ; (IR µ;s ) incentive compatibility constraints:
and nonnegativity constraints:
q s (µ)¸0; 8µ 2 £; 8s 2 f1; :::; ng :
The …rst-best solution to the regulator's problem is attained in the absence of private information, in which case the IC µ; b µ constraints can be ignored. Since ® < 1, it is optimal to set the transfers as low as possible so that the EIR µ constraint will be just binding.
Substituting from the EIR µ constraints into the objective function and maximizing with respect to q s (µ) reveals that the …rst-best production level, q ¤ s (µ), is implicitly de…ned by
8µ 2 £; 8s 2 f1; :::; ng :
Since S(¢) is increasing, concave, and continuously di¤erentiable, and since c s (µ) > 0, q ¤ s (µ) is positive and unique. By EIR µ , the …rst-best transfers and expected pro…t of the …rm must therefore be such that:
As in the two-types, two states case, the regulator has in general many degrees of freedom in setting the transfers such that the IR µ;s constraints will be satis…ed. For instance, the regulator can set the transfers such that t
for all s 2 f1; :::; ng, in which case the …rm just breaks even in every state. However, if M < 0, the regulator can also set transfers such that the …rm will earn positive pro…ts in some states and will incur losses (smaller than jMj) in other states.
In the next subsection we show that the …rst-best solution can be implemented even if the …rm's type is private information, provided that the maximum de…cit jMj is su¢ciently large. In Section 3.3 we will consider the second-best solution when it is impossible to achieve the …rst-best solution.
Implementation of the …rst-best solution
To establish conditions under which the …rst-best solution can be implemented, we …rst replace the IC µ; b µ constraints with the …rst-order necessary conditions for truthful revelation, assuming that the state-contingent regulatory scheme, (q s (µ); t s (µ)) s=1;:::;n , is di¤erentiable.
We will then verify that the resulting solution is di¤erentiable and will provide conditions ensuring that it is globally incentive compatible.
5
Let b µ be the report of a …rm whose true type is µ. If all …rms report their types truthfully, then, local incentive compatibility requires that,
Di¤erentiating (21) and using (22), we get X
Ignoring global incentive compatibility for the moment, the …rst-best solution can be implemented, provided that we can …nd transfers such that (17) and (18) 
subject to (16) and (18). If the solution to this maxmin problem is above M for all µ 2 £, then it is possible to …nd transfers that implement the …rst-best solution. Otherwise, any system of transfers that induces truthfully reports and leaves zero expected rents (i.e., satis…es equations (16) and (18)) will necessarily be such that the …rm would lose more than jMj in at least one state of nature. Such a system of transfers would then violate at least one of the IR µ;s constraints.
Lemma 5: The solution to the above maxmin problem must be such that the …rm earns a pro…t in exactly one state of nature and incurs the same loss in all other states.
Proof: Clearly, ¼ ¤ s (µ) = 0 for all s 2 f1; :::; ng cannot be a solution since it violates (18). By (16) then, the …rm necessarily earns a positive pro…t in at least one state of nature and incurs a loss in at least one other state of nature. 5 On the di¤erential approach to mechanism design, see La¤ont and Maskin (1980) . Now …x µ and consider any solution to the maxmin problem. Let i be the state in which the …rm's pro…t is highest and j be the state in which its loss is highest. That is,
for all s 2 f1; :::; ng. To show that the …rm earns a positive pro…t in exactly one state and makes the same loss in all other states, we prove that ¼ ¤ s (µ) = ¼ ¤ j (µ) for all s 6 = fi; jg. To this end, suppose by way of negation that there exists a state k 6 = fi; jg
, substituting in (18) and simplifying, we get
", then the above equation continues to hold. By (16), the resulting change in
". The pro…t levels in all other states remain unchanged. From these expressions it is clear that we can always choose " small enough such that after we increase
. This contradicts the assumed optimality of the solution. Consequently, it must be the case that
, it follows that for all µ 2 £, the …rm earns a pro…t only in state i and incurs the same loss in all other states. ¥ Lemma 5 is a key step in characterizing the least restrictive set of conditions under which it is possible to implement the …rst-best solution to the regulator's problem because it says that the …rst-best can be implemented with a regulatory scheme that involves only two pro…t levels for the …rm: a positive pro…t in one state and a loss in all other states. Moreover, this regulatory scheme involves minimal punishments in any given state of nature and hence has the "best shot" at satisfying the state-by-state limited-de…cit constraints. Intuitively, in order to induce truth telling, the regulator needs to "punish" the …rm whenever it misreports its type. Since the …rm does not know in advance which state of nature will be realized, it takes into account only the expected level of the punishments. Hence, in order to satisfy the state-by-state limited-de…cit constraints, it is optimal for the regulator to spread the punishments over as many states as possible. The regulator must then "reward" the …rm in the remaining state of nature in order to ensure that it breaks even on average (otherwise its EIR µ constraint is violated). From this intuition it is clear that we may also be able to implement the …rst-best solution to the regulator's problem with other types of regulatory schemes; for instance, we may be able to implement the …rst-best solution with schemes that involve more than just one level of reward, or more than just one level of punishment, or a scheme that rewards the …rm in more than one state of nature. However, such regulatory schemes will be able to implement the …rst-best solution to the regulator's problem under more stringent limited de…cit constraints than the maxmin scheme.
Given Lemma 5 we can now characterize the reward and punishment that the regulator uses in the maxmin scheme. Since
for all s 6 = fi; jg, and using the fact that P s p s (µ) = 1 and
Equation (21) shows that the reward state must be such that p 0 i (µ) > 0. This also insures that the pro…t levels in (21) are well-de…ned. Moreover, it is clear that in order to satisfy the state-by-state limited-de…cit constraints, it must be the case that the punishment is such that ¡
, or
· ¡M for all µ 2 £. Since we are interested in a regulatory scheme that can implement the …rst-best solution to the regulator's problem under the most stringent limited de…cit constraints, we should obviously pick the state with the highest
ratio in order to reward the …rm.
Given (21), the transfers that implement the …rst-best solution for the widest set of values of M are such that
These transfers are clearly di¤erentiable (recall that p 0 i (µ) > 0 for all µ 2 £). We must now check that these transfers satisfy the IC µ; b µ constraints not only locally but for also globally, i.e., for all µ; b µ 2 £. To this end, we …rst impose the following restrictions on the conditional probability system. Assumption 1. The conditional probability p s (µ) is a continuously di¤erentiable function of µ with p s (µ)¸² > 0 for all s 2 f1; :::; ng and all µ 2 £. Moreover, p n (µ) is an increasing and concave function of µ for all µ 2 £. pn (µ) , is decreasing with µ for all s 6 = n.
The …rst part of Assumption 1 ensures that all states of nature can be realized no matter what the …rm's type is. Absent this assumption, say if p s (µ) for some s and some µ then, after observing the state s the regulator would be able to rule out the possibility that the …rm's type is µ. The …rst part of Assumption 1 then ensures that the regulator cannot rule out any type on the basis of the realized state of nature. The second part of Assumption 1 says that the probability of drawing the worst state, n; increases with the …rm's type but at a decreasing rate. This implies in turn that less e¢cient types are more likely to draw state n than more e¢cient types. Corollary 1.4 in Riordan and Sappington (1988) shows that the concavity of the likelihood function for the signal (our Assumption 1 in essence) together with the convexity of the cost function with respect to µ (which we also assume), ensure the existence of transfers that implement the …rst-best. It is therefore not surprising that these properties will play a similar role in our setting. Assumption 2 implies that more e¢cient types have a higher probability of having good states (i.e., states with "small" index) than less e¢cient types. That is, P s<t p s ( b µ) < P s<t p s (µ) for b µ > µ and t < n. Assumption 3 implies that
for all µ 2 £. It is therefore a form of the monotone likelihood ratio property (Milgrom, 1981) which is common in the mechanism design literature. 
Proposition 2 generalizes the …rst-best implementation Theorem of Riordan and Sappington (1988) , and particularly Corollary 1.4 in their paper. The only somewhat unusual assumption in the statement of Proposition 2 is: "q ¤ s (µ)c 0 s (µ) is nondecreasing with s". This assumption is only a su¢cient condition for …rst-best implementation and only involves fundamental data of the model; in particular we can reformulate it as,
The following simple example will help to illustrate this assumption. Suppose that S(q) = q 1¡² 1¡²
(the inverse demand for the regulated good, P , has constant elasticity, ²) and c s (µ) =
) is increasing with s for all µ 2 £ if and only if ² > 1 (i.e., if the elasticity of the inverse demand function exceeds 1). Clearly, the assumption is not very restrictive and holds if the inverse demand for the regulated …rm's good is elastic.
The second-best solution under ex post limited-de…cit constraints
In this section we assume that condition (23) fails so that it is impossible to construct transfers that implement the …rst-best production level. We therefore characterize the second-best regulatory scheme that solves RP 0 subject to the IC µ; b µ ; EIR µ and IR µ;s constraints. Our strategy for solving this constrained optimization problem will be to substitute the necessary condition for local incentive compatibility (17) in RP 0 and to ignore the ex ante participation constraints EIR µ in a …rst step. We will then check that the resulting solution is di¤erentiable, satis…es the EIR µ constraints, and is globally incentive compatible.
Using (17) and the de…nition r s (µ)´p
, we can express t 0 n (µ) as a function of the other n ¡ 1 transfers functions:
Integrating t 0 n (µ) from µ (the "worst" type) to µ yields,
where the second equality follows from integration by parts. Since by de…nition, ¼ s (µ) = t s (µ)¡c s (µ)q s (µ) and r n (µ) = 1, the …rst three terms in the above expression equal
. Hence, the square bracketed expression equals
We therefore write the …rm's transfer in state n as
Given (24), using the fact that r s (µ)´p
and simplifying, the expected transfer of the …rm, where the expectation is taken with respect to the …rm's type and with respect to the state of nature, is given by
After integration by parts, the expression in the last line of (25) becomes
where
Substituting from (25) and (26) into (RP 0 ) and rearranging, the regulator's problem, given local incentive compatibility, becomes max (q s (µ)) s=1;::;n (t s (µ)) s=1;::;n¡1
subject to the EIR µ constraints, the IR µ;s constraints, and subject to the constraints that q s (µ)¸0 for all s = f1; :::; ng and all µ 2 £.
To characterize the solution to the regulator's problem we shall study a relaxed version of RP " in which we ignore the EIR µ constraints and maximize the regulator's objective function pointwise, subject to the IR µ;s constraints and the nonnegativity constraint on q s (µ). We will then verify that the solution to the relaxed problem is di¤erentiable and will provide su¢cient conditions for this solution to satisfy the EIR µ constraints and to be globally incentive compatible.
Lemma 6: The regulator's relaxed problem, RP ", has a unique solution such that
This solution is di¤erentiable in µ, and if the conditional hazard rate
is nonincreasing with µ; then q ¤¤ s (µ) is decreasing with µ for all s, implying that less e¢cient types produce less in every state of nature.
Proof: By Assumption 3, the coe¢cient of ¼ s (µ) in RP " is negative for all s 6 = n (since r 0 n (µ) = 0, the coe¢cient of ¼ n (µ) is 0). Hence, it is optimal for the regulator to set transfers such that ¼ s (µ) will be as low as possible; given the IR µ;s constraints, it follows that at the solution to the relaxed problem,
6 = n. Substituting this equality in RP " and recalling that r 0 n (µ) = 0, the …rst-order condition for q s (µ) is
Now, note that the cumulative distribution of µ, conditional on state n being realized, is given by
Substituting this equality in (30) and simplifying, yields equation (27). Since S(¢) is increasing and concave, q ¤¤ s (µ) is di¤erentiable and unique. If
is nonincreasing with µ (so
is nondecreasing with µ), then, together with the assumption that c s (µ) is increasing and convex, the right-hand side of (27) is increasing with µ, so q ¤¤ s (µ) is decreasing with µ: To characterize the transfers, note that (28) follows immediately from the fact that ¼ s (µ) = M for all s 6 = n; and all µ 2 £: As for (29), note that since by de…nition r 0 n (µ) = 0, t n (µ) appears only in the second line of RP ". Hence, it is clear that it is optimal to choose the transfers of type µ such that P s r s (µ)¼ s (µ) = 0 Substituting this equality in (24), using (28) and the fact that r n (µ) = 1 and r 0 n (µ) = 0, yields
Noting that P s6 =n r n (µ) =
, yields (29). From (28) and (29) it is clear that t ¤¤ s (µ) is unique and di¤erentiable for all s. ¥ Equation (27) is the continuous analog of (12) and (13). Since F (µ j n) = 0, it follows
: the regulator uses marginal cost pricing for the lowest possible type of the …rm so there is no distortion "at the top." This is exactly as in the two-types, twostates case (see equation (12)). For higher cost types, equations (15) and (27) 
is the continuous analog of
, it follows that the distortion term in equation (27) is the exact analog of the distortion term in equation (13). Hence, just like in the two-types, two-states case, the regulator distorts the …rm's output to a larger extent when (i) he attaches a smaller weight to …rm's pro…ts, (ii) there is a bigger di¤erence between the costs of di¤erent types of the …rm, and (iii) there is a relatively low likelihood that the …rm's cost is low. Moreover, since the right-hand side of (27) is increasing with s, the …rm's output level is smaller in worse states of nature. Equation (27) generalizes the results of Baron and Myerson (1982) and Demougin and Garvie (1991) . To see how, suppose …rst that there is only one state of nature, i.e., n = 1; and let the marginal cost be given by c(µ) = µ. Then, (27) becomes,
which is just Baron and Myerson's (1982) classic formula for second-best optimality.
Next, suppose that the regulator's objective is to maximize consumers' surplus so that ® = 0; and suppose that the marginal cost is state independent and given by c(µ) = µ.
Then, (27) becomes
which is just equation (2) in Demougin and Garvie (1991). 6 Given the transfers in (28) and (29), the expected pro…t of a type µ …rm is P s p s (µ)¼ s (µ) = 0: Hence, the second-best solution features the familiar no (expected) rent "at the bottom"
property. In the next proposition we establish su¢cient conditions under which all types µ < µ earn positive expected rents due to their private information. This ensures in turn that all the EIR µ constraints are satis…ed. In addition, the conditions ensure that the solution to the regulator's relaxed problem is globally incentive compatible.
Proposition 3. Suppose that Assumptions 1-3 hold and the conditional hazard rate
is nonincreasing with µ. Then, for all M, there exists a ± > 0 such that if jp 0 s (µ)j < ± for all s = f1; :::; ng, the solution characterized by (27)- (29) satis…es the EIR µ constraints and is globally incentive compatible.
Conclusion
In this paper we studied the design of optimal regulation schemes when the regulated …rm is subject to ex post cost shocks. We showed that the regulator can design a regulatory scheme that adjusts itself automatically following the realization of each shock without having to renegotiate the entire scheme. Our model di¤ers from most of the optimal regulation literature in that …rms have multidimensional types: they di¤er from each other not only with respect to their production costs but also with respect to the likelihood of having a cost shock: some types are more susceptible to negative shocks than others.
We showed that under certain conditions, the regulator can exploit the correlation between …rms' types and the likelihood of the various cost shocks and design a regulatory scheme that implements the …rst-best solution, despite the fact that the …rm's type is private information. To implement the …rst-best, the regulator needs to punish the …rm if the realized state of nature is relatively unlikely given the …rm's reported type. And, in order to ensure that the …rm breaks even on average (so the regulatory scheme does not amount to a con…scation of property), the regulator needs to reward the …rm in the remaining states. In general, however, …rms cannot sustain unlimited losses and this fact imposes a constraint on the regulatory scheme. Our analysis reveals that the scheme that implements the …rst-best solution under the most stringent limited-de…cit constraints "rewards" the …rm in exactly one state of nature and imposes the same "punishment" on the …rm in all other states. This scheme is feasible provided that the correlation between the …rm's type and the cost shocks is su¢ciently strong and/or the …rm can sustain su¢ciently large de…cits in any given state.
When these conditions fail, we are able to fully characterize the solution to the regulator's problem and show that it has classical second-best features. One bene…t of our approach is that we extend the well known Baron and Myerson methodology to the case of ex post cost shocks and limited liability constraints and can characterize the optimal solution using straightforward calculus. 
as required.
(ii) If R ¤ > 0, the …rst-best solution cannot be implemented, since it violates IC`.
Consequently, IC`must be binding at the optimum. Given that EIR h is binding as well,
Hence IC`can be written as
where the left-hand side is just the expected pro…t of the low type …rm.
The regulator's problem is given by RP subject to equation (A-1),
and subject to monotonicity of output. To characterize the solution, we shall relax the problem by ignoring the monotonicity conditions, obtain a solution, and then verify that at this solution, output is indeed monotonic in the …rm's type. Recalling that since EIR h is binding, the high type …rm gets expected pro…t zero, while the expected pro…t of the low type is given by the right-hand side of (A-1), the regulator's problem can be rewritten as max q hg ;q`g;q hb ;q`b
he properties of S and C µs ensure that the solution to the regulator's problem is de…ned implicitly by the …rst order conditions (12) and (13). To verify that output is monotonic in the …rm's type as we assumed above, note that the conditions in the proposition imply that 
8s 6 = n:
for all s 6 = n, implying that state n has the highest
ratio and hence should be the one in which the …rm is rewarded.
Since the maxmin transfers de…ned by (22) were derived from (16), these transfers clearly satisfy the EIR µ constraint for all µ 2 £. We now check that these transfers ensure global incentive compatibility. To this end, note that if we substitute the maxmin transfers from (22) with i = n into the IC µ; b µ constraints and simplify, we get
where the left hand side vanishes because the transfers were chosen such that
Assuming that b µ > µ and dividing by b µ ¡ µ, the right-hand side of (A-2) can be written
Since c s (µ) is increasing and convex, while by Assumption 1, p n (µ) is increasing and concave
Hence, using the de…nition of
The expression in the last line of (A-3) is nonpositive since by assumption, q Finally we need to verify that the …rst-best production levels can be implemented with the maxmin transfers if and only if (23) holds. Since by construction, the maxmin transfers satisfy the EIR µ constraints and since we already veri…ed that they ensure global incentive compatibility, we only need to verify that the maxmin transfers satisfy the IR µ;s constraints. The "if" part of the statement follows directly from the fact that if (23) holds, then the maxmin transfers ensure that …rm's loss in states 1; :::; n ¡ 1 is equal to or exceeds M . To prove the "only if" part, note that since by construction, the maxmin transfers ensure that the …rm's loss is minimal in every given state, and since Assumption 3 ensures that state n has the highest
ratio, it is obvious that if (23) is violated for some µ; then under any system of transfers that is locally incentive compatible and leaves the …rm no expected rent (i.e., satis…es equation (16) and (18)), at least one type …rm would incur a loss greater than M in at least one state. That is, at least one of IR µ;s constraints will be violated. ¥ Proof of Proposition 3. We begin with the EIR µ constraints. The proof of Lemma 6 shows that P s r s (µ)¼ s (µ) = 0. Hence, EIR µ is binding. To show that EIR µ holds for µ < µ, note from (29) that the pro…t of type µ < µ in state n is , the expected pro…t of type µ < µ is
where B ¤¤ (x)´P s p s (x)c Since EIR µ is binding (so P s p s (µ)¼ ¤¤ s (µ) = 0), it is su¢cient to show that the derivative in (A-4) is negative in order to establish that the EIR µ constraints are satis…ed for all µ 2 £.
Our strategy will be to show that the right-hand side of (A-4) is bounded from above and its upper bound is negative for small enough ±.
To …nd an upper bound for the right-hand side of (A-4), note from the proof of Lemma 6 that,
But since by Assumption 1, p n (µ) is increasing with µ,
On the other hand, since by Assumption 1, p s (µ)¸² > 0 for all s 2 f1; :::; ng and all µ 2 £,
Therefore, equation (27) implies that for all s 2 f1; :::; ng and all µ 2 £, q where the second line follows because ² · p s (µ) · 1 for all s 2 f1; :::; ng and all µ 2 £.
For su¢ciently low ±, the right-hand side of (A-5) is negative, so We now establish that as ± goes to 0, the left-hand side of (A-8) converges to a strictly positive term while the right-hand side has an upper bound that converges to 0. We begin
